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 Inclusive Equality and New Forms of 
Social Governance  
Colleen Sheppard* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Caught in the preoccupation with the present and the presumptions 
of existing doctrinal frameworks, we sometimes fail to reflect upon 
current predicaments from a macro-historical perspective. In 2003, two 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada involved extensive discus-
sions of constitutional equality rights.1 In both cases, the Court unani-
mously held that section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms2 had been violated and that the violations were not justified 
under section 1. Perhaps this unanimity reflects a shared clarity regard-
ing the meaning of substantive equality, unlike the divergence of views 
evident in the fractured Supreme Court opinions of 2002.3 However, in 
both of the 2003 cases, the Supreme Court of Canada overturned pro-
vincial court of appeal decisions that had found no violation of section 
15(1) equality rights.4 Furthermore, dissenting opinions have resurfaced 
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1
  See Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 32 [hereinafter “Trociuk”]; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Mar-
tin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] 
S.C.J. No. 54 [hereinafter “Martin”]. 
2
  Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
3
  See Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24 [hereinafter 
“Lavoie”]; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, [2002] S.C.J. 85 
[hereinafter “Gosselin”]; Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R 325, 
[2002] S.C.J. No. 84. 
4
  See Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2001), 90 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 200 
D.L.R. (4th ) 685, [2001] B.C.J. No. 1052 (C.A.) [hereinafter “Trociuk C.A.”]; Martin v. 
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in the 2004 Supreme Court equality jurisprudence.5 The linchpin of the 
analyses in all of the various Supreme Court judgments, and at the dif-
ferent appellate levels, continues to be whether the legislative provisions 
violate human dignity, such that the differential treatment constitutes 
discrimination.6 The divergent results attest to ongoing uncertainty 
about the meaning and application of substantive equality, and the mal-
leable concept of human dignity. It would appear, therefore, to be an 
appropriate historical moment to reflect more broadly on where we are 
in terms of constitutional equality rights. 
In this article, I seek to understand the contested meanings and ap-
plications of constitutional equality rights by examining how changing 
ideologies about the role of the state influence legal developments. Such 
an analysis is particularly important in the constitutional law domain, 
given its concern with the relationship between the state, individuals, 
institutions, and communities. These shifting understandings of the role 
of the state, including classical liberalism and the negative state, the 
postwar social welfare state, neoliberalism and the privatization of state 
responsibilities, and emerging forms of post-neoliberal social govern-
ance, have had important effects on legislative and constitutional re-
form, and on judicial interpretations of human rights protections. After 
reviewing divergent approaches to human dignity in recent jurispru-
dence, I endeavour to situate uncertainties about the meaning of sub-
stantive equality in the context of shifting public policy paradigms. I 
conclude by proposing some preliminary ideas about how we might 
restructure the contextual factors set out by the Supreme Court of Can-
ada in the leading case on equality7 in order to achieve a synthesis of the 
substantive and procedural dimensions of equality — an approach I call 
“inclusive equality”.8 
                                                                                                                                
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) (2000), 192 D.L.R. (4th ) 611, 188 N.S.R. (2d ) 
330 [hereinafter “Martin C.A.”]. 
5
  See Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2004 SCC 4, [2004] S.C.J. No. 6. Moreover, some fairly contentious cases loom on 
the horizon (e.g., same sex marriage, limitations in funding for treatment of autism, the 
constitutionality of state-based restrictions on privatized healthcare, and pay equity). 
6
  See Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12 [hereinafter “Law”]. 
7
  Id. 
8
  The language of inclusiveness is used by numerous scholars in discussing concep-
tions of equality. See generally Anthony Giddens, The Third Way — The Renewal of Social 
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II. CONTINUED UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE MEANING OF 
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Despite the Supreme Court’s effort to articulate a coherent frame-
work for adjudicating claims of constitutional equality in Law9 contin-
ued uncertainty characterizes the post-Law jurisprudence.10 The most 
contentious dimension of the Law framework is the third prong of the 
test, which requires adjudicators to decide if a legislative provision or 
government policy is discriminatory “in a substantive sense”.11 This 
third inquiry occurs once adjudicators have determined that (i) there is 
differential treatment in purpose or effects, and (ii) that the differential 
treatment is based on an enumerated or analogous ground. These first 
two inquiries can also be complex and contested; however, in a large 
number of cases, disagreement between judges and courts occurs at the 
third step. According to the Supreme Court, the overarching purpose of 
section 15 is respect for “human dignity”. In evaluating a discrimination 
claim, and deciding whether the human dignity of a claimant has been 
violated, the courts take into account four contextual factors:  
(i) Pre-existing disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice, or vulnerability 
experienced by the individual or group at issue…  
(ii) The correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ground or grounds 
upon which the claim is based and the actual need, capacity, or 
circumstances of the claimant and others…  
                                                                                                                                
Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998) at 101-11; I.M. Young, Inclusion and Democ-
racy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), at 11-14; I.M. Young, “Communication and 
the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy” in S. Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference 
— Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), at 
120-35; D. Greschner, “The Right to Belong: The Promise of Vriend” (1998) 9 N.J.C.L. 417; 
D. Greschner, “Case Comment: Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 
Queen’s L.J. 299 [hereinafter “Greschner, ‘Case Comment’”].  
9
  Law, supra, note 6.  
10
  There have been numerous commentaries on the Law case: See generally “Gre-
schner, “Case Comment”, supra, note 8; B. Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” 
(2000) 11:3 Constitutional Forum 65; D. Proulx, “Les droits à l’égalité revus et corrigés par la 
Cour suprême du Canada dans l’arrêt Law: un pas en avant ou un pas en arrière” (2001) 61 
revue du Barreau 187; E. Grabham, “Law v. Canada: New Directions for Equality under the 
Canadian Charter?” (2002) 22 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 641. 
11
  Law, supra, note 6, at para. 39.  
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(iii) The ameliorative purpose or effects of the impugned law in terms of 
other groups in society…  
(iv) The nature and scope of the interest affected by the impugned law… 12  
Given the arguably amorphous nature of these contextual factors, it 
is perhaps no surprise that there is significant room for divergent as-
sessments and outcomes. 
The key inquiry at the third stage of the Law test appears to be: 
“whether a reasonable person in circumstances similar to those of the 
claimant would find that the legislation which imposes differential 
treatment has the effect of demeaning his or her dignity?”13 Human 
dignity, according to the Supreme Court, “concerns the manner in which 
a person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law”.14 
When claimants lose, judges have often speculated that the reasonable 
claimant would not have felt a denial of human dignity. Thus, in addi-
tion to losing in court, claimants are effectively told that their percep-
tions of inequality are not consistent with a reasonable claimant’s 
perceptions. In tort law, it is usually the alleged tortfeasor’s conduct that 
is assessed for its reasonableness.15 Civil liability potentially flows from 
failing to conform to a reasonable person standard. Something seems 
amiss when we use this terminology in the equality rights domain,16 and 
it is especially disturbing that a reasonableness standard is imposed on 
the claimant rather than the equivalent of the “tortfeasor” in this context. 
                                                                                                                                
12
  Law, supra, note 6, at paras. 62-75.  
13
  Id., at para. 60. 
14
  Id., at para 53 [emphasis added]. The requirement that the claimant’s subjective feel-
ings be “legitimate” is another way of affirming the objective dimension to the discrimination 
inquiry. 
15
  There is consideration of the reasonableness of the claimant in the context of in-
formed consent law in medical malpractice cases. Generally, however, the focus is on the 
tortfeasor. I am indebted to Derek Jones for ideas on the interplay between equality law and 
tort law. 
16
  See generally Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, per Iacobucci J., at para. 90 
[hereinafter “Lovelace”]; Lavoie, supra, note 3, per Arbour J., at para. 123; Gosselin, supra, 
note 3, per McLachlin C.J., at para. 62: “....the Regulation was aimed at ameliorating the 
situation of welfare recipients under 30. A reasonable person in Ms. Gosselin’s position 
would take this into account in determining whether the scheme treated under-30s as less 
worthy of respect and consideration…” [See also paras. 67 and 69]; Granovsky v. Canada 
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, at 
paras. 70 and 81 [hereinafter “Granovsky”].  
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Why is it not the government actor who is held to a standard of reason-
ableness? Moreover, the pathbreaking jurisprudence of the mid-1980s 
taught us that discrimination may occur despite the absence of any in-
tent to discriminate.17 If this is the case, then why is the ameliorative 
purpose (i.e., intent) even considered when recognition of adverse ef-
fects discrimination was to have rendered intent irrelevant?  
1. Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)18 
Uncertainty linked to differing assessments of human dignity is evi-
dent in Trociuk. Justice Deschamps, writing for a unanimous court, had 
to assess whether the differential treatment of mothers and fathers in the 
birth registration and surnaming process, under British Columbia’s Vital 
Statistics Act19 was discriminatory. The legislation gave birth mothers 
the option of not including the father on the birth registration forms, 
either because the father was unknown or because the mother chose to 
list the father as unacknowledged. If a father were unacknowledged, he 
was also precluded from the process of determining the surname of the 
children. The legislative provisions were designed to ensure that moth-
ers who had valid reasons for not acknowledging a known father (i.e., 
incest, sexual assault) had certainty that there would be no disclosure of 
the father’s identity. This certainty would encourage mothers to register 
their children’s births promptly and accurately. The provisions were also 
designed to reduce conflict between parents, effectively giving the 
mother decision-making authority over the children’s surnames if a 
father was unacknowledged. On the facts of the Trociuk case, the two 
issues were linked. The mother’s decision to list the father as unacknow-
ledged was linked to the parents’ dispute about the surname of the chil-
dren. She was willing to include his name on the birth registration, but 
wanted the children to have her surname only, since she had sole cus-
tody of them.  
                                                                                                                                
17
  See Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 
[1985] S.C.J. No. 74; Action travail des femmes v. Canadian National Railway, [1987] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (sub nom. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Can. (Canadian 
Human Rights Commission); cited with approval in Andrews v. Law Society of British Co-
lumbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6. 
18
  Trociuk, supra, note 1. 
19
  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 479. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously concluded that section 
15 was violated — that the differential treatment accorded mothers and 
fathers in the legislation was discriminatory and undermined the human 
dignity of fathers. In assessing the contextual factors, Deschamps J. 
begins with the fourth factor, the nature of the interest affected, noting at 
the outset “[p]arents have a significant interest in meaningfully partici-
pating in the lives of their children”.20 She then concludes that the inclu-
sion of a father’s particulars on the birth registration, and involvement in 
the process of determining a child’s surname are important dimensions 
of parental participation in a child’s life.21 Drawing on academic com-
mentary that the historical inability of mothers to pass on their surnames 
constituted “a sign of the inferiority of women and their incapacity to 
perpetuate a line by filiation”,22 Justice Deschamps concludes that a 
“father who is arbitrarily excluded from this activity would reasonably 
perceive that a significant interest has been affected”.23 
On the question of whether such exclusion would demean a father’s 
dignity, Deschamps J. begins by noting that the absence of historical 
disadvantage against fathers (men) as a group is not dispositive of 
whether a reasonable claimant would perceive a violation of human 
dignity. Instead, she concludes that it would be reasonable “to perceive 
that the legislature is sending a message that a father’s relationship with 
his children is less worthy of respect than that between a mother and her 
                                                                                                                                
20
  Trociuk, supra, note 1, at para. 15. 
21
  It may be important to understand this conclusion in light of the civil law tradition of 
according significant legal importance to “filiation” and formal recognition of the parent-
child bond, including an historical focus on the father-child relationship. For a discussion of 
the civilian concept of filiation, see M.F. Bureau, “L’union civile et les nouvelles règles de 
filiation au Québec: contrepoint discordant ou éloge de la parenté désirée” (2003) 105 Revue 
du Notariat 901, at 906-10 (and references cited therein). The common law tradition is much 
less concerned with establishing the formal legal nature of family relationships, dealing with 
family relationships predominantly in terms of the legal consequences in the wake of family 
breakdown.  
22
  M.D. Castelli, “Rapport de l’O.R.C.C. sur le nom et l’identité physique de la per-
sonne humaine” (1976) 17 C. de D. 372, at 374. 
23
  Trociuk, supra, note 1, at para. 18. Such reasoning identifies a history of discrimina-
tion against mothers to draw conclusions about the legal effects of a law on fathers. For a 
compelling critique of the formal equality dimensions of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Trociuk, see H. Lessard, “Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality 
Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General)” (November, 2003), forth-
coming, Canadian Journal of Women and the Law [hereinafter “Lessard, ‘Mothers’”].  
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children”.24 Moreover, Deschamps J. finds a further infringement of 
dignity in the pejorative association between fathers who are excluded 
without valid reasons by a mother and those who are justifiably ex-
cluded (i.e., rapists, perpetrators of incest).25 In terms of the ameliorative 
purpose of the impugned provisions for women and children, Des-
champs J. maintains:  
 In the present case, a reasonable claimant would perceive that the 
legislature could protect a mother from the unwanted disclosure of a 
justifiably unacknowledged father’s identity, without exposing other 
fathers to the risk of arbitrary exclusion…. The reasonable claimant would 
conclude that his exclusion was not necessary to achieving the 
ameliorative objective. He would reasonably perceive that his significant 
interest in participation in his children’s lives was superfluously sacrificed 
in the pursuit of that objective. The reasonable claimant would conclude 
that, despite a correspondence between the ameliorative purpose and the 
legislative exclusion, his dignity was infringed.26 
One critique of this reasoning is that the human dignity analysis, consid-
ered from the perspective of a reasonable claimant, requires the Court to 
do a considerable amount of balancing of rights and interests within the 
confines of section 15 to reach the conclusion. Why wouldn’t a reason-
able claimant perceive that his situation was anomalous and isolated and 
that in the vast majority of cases, the provision achieved an ameliorative 
objective that redressed a long history of disadvantage against mothers? 
Why wouldn’t a reasonable claimant realize that the legislature was 
seeking to protect mothers, not harm fathers, nor undermine the human 
dignity of fathers? 27 
To add to the uncertainty, a majority of the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal and the trial judge reached the opposite conclusion. Justice 
                                                                                                                                
24
  Id., at para. 21. 
25
  Id., at para 23. 
26
  Id., at para 29. 
27
  Id., at para. 42. In assessing s. 1, Deschamps J. finds that the legislative provisions 
did not minimally impair fathers’ rights, since no procedural mechanism was provided for 
unjustifiably unacknowledged fathers to contest their exclusion. Indeed, she notes that 
amendments to the legislation since the litigation began provide fathers with a mechanism for 
being included on the birth registration documents, demonstrating a less restrictive alterna-
tive. Id., at para. 42. The contrast with judicial assessments of the reasonable claimant in 
Lovelace, supra, note 16, Granovsky, supra, note 16, Lavoie (dissent), supra, note 3 and 
Gosselin, supra note 3, is significant.  
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Southin of the Court of Appeal rejected the section 15 claims of Mr. 
Trociuk. She suggested that his argument in effect would require that 
“every man that can prove his paternity has a right to be on the birth 
certificate and have the child bear his name”.28  
 There is nothing in the evidence in this case to persuade me that the 
benefits to fathers of such judicial statute revision would not be thought, 
by many mothers and would-be mothers, especially those who have 
deliberately chosen to be single mothers, to be a serious diminution of 
their rights — to constitute “discrimination” against them.29  
Justice Southin is so convinced of the groundlessness of the equality 
arguments that she does not even provide extensive reasons for her 
conclusions, beyond the suggestion that to find discrimination in the 
substantive sense “is going far beyond any of the authorities on section 
15”.30 
Justice Newbury, in her concurring reasons, provides further justifi-
cations for concluding that the statute does not discriminate against 
fathers. She writes: 
…I do not believe the effect of the differential treatment of mothers and 
fathers under the Vital Statistics Act promotes the view that fathers are 
“less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value” as human beings or 
members of Canadian society. If anyone has been historically regarded as 
“less worthy”, it is single mothers, who until recently were treated as 
“fallen women”, and their children, who were stigmatized as illegitimate 
or worse. The impugned legislation has removed the statutory and legal 
attributes of illegitimacy but has not removed the societal and practical 
difficulties that face single mothers. The terminology employed by the 
Court in Law is simply not apt to describe fathers in Mr. Trociuk’s 
situation.31  
                                                                                                                                
28
  Trociuk C.A., supra, note 4, at para. 82. 
29
  Id., at para. 84. 
30
  Id., at para. 83. 
31
  Id., at para 179. Justice Newbury also commented at para. 177: “To require mothers 
to acknowledge fathers against their wishes would be a serious incursion into the interests of 
the mother, who may have good reason for refusing to acknowledge (and disclose in a public 
document) the identity of the father”. On the nature of the interest affected, she wrote at para. 
178: “If by being denied rights of registration and naming, Mr. Trociuk was also being 
excluded from the right to participate in the support and upbringing of his children as well as 
in their naming, I would agree that s. 15 was clearly engaged. But all that is in issue in this 
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In her dissent, however, Prowse J.A. concludes otherwise, writing: 
I conclude that the differential treatment of mothers and fathers under 
these provisions withhold a benefit from fathers in a manner which has the 
effect of signaling to them and to society as a whole that fathers are less 
capable or less worthy of recognition or value than mothers, and that they 
are not regarded as being equally deserving of concern, respect and 
consideration. … if these rights are significant to mothers, surely it is 
reasonable to conclude they are equally significant to fathers.32  
For Prowse J.A., the provisions did not meet the minimal impair-
ment test under section 1 — “the impugned provisions permit the 
mother to become the ultimate arbiter of the rights of the father in rela-
tion to registration and naming of children”.33  
…Such a right could be circumscribed, however… by giving the father a 
right exercisable within a limited time, to show cause why he should be 
acknowledged on the birth registration as the father… In my view, 
providing the father with the right to challenge his exclusion from the 
registration and naming process would be more likely to deter a mother 
from providing false or spurious reasons for refusing to acknowledge the 
father. 34 
My point in including these diametrically opposed judicial conclusions 
is simply to underline the indeterminacy of the current test for constitu-
tional discrimination. 
2.  Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova 
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur35 
In Martin, the issue was the exclusion of chronic pain from the 
regular workers’ compensation benefits and the provision instead of a 
limited four-week Functional Restoration Program.36 Again, the out-
                                                                                                                                
case is the right asserted by Mr. Trociuk to insist that the children’s surnames be double-
barreled and include his name”. Mr. Trociuk had been legally recognized as the father in a 
court order that also confirmed his support obligations and access rights to the children. 
32
  Id., at paras. 143 and 145. 
33
  Id., at para. 153. 
34
  Id., at para. 156. 
35
  Martin, supra, note 1.  
36
  Id. 
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comes differed at the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal levels. 
The key divergence of opinion was focused on the human dignity re-
quirement, assessed in relation to the four contextual factors set out in 
Law. The Supreme Court of Canada found that exclusion of chronic 
pain injuries was discriminatory and violated the human dignity of the 
claimant, while the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal reached the opposite 
conclusion. 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada, Gonthier J. em-
phasizes at the outset that regarding the historical disadvantage factor, 
the “claimants belong to a larger group — disabled persons — who have 
experienced historical disadvantage or stereotypes”.37 In terms of the 
second contextual factor, Gonthier J. highlights the actual effects of the 
exclusion: 
The challenged provisions … while maintaining the bar to tort actions, 
exclude chronic pain from the purview of the general compensation 
scheme provided for by the Act. Thus, no earning replacement benefits, 
permanent impairment benefits, retirement annuities, vocational 
rehabilitation services or medical aid can be provided with respect to 
chronic pain….Instead, workers … who suffer from chronic pain are 
entitled to a four-week Functional Restoration Program, after which no 
further benefits are available.38  
While the respondents maintained that the four-week program re-
sponded effectively to the medical needs of chronic pain sufferers, 
Gonthier J. disagrees, finding that the impugned provisions do not re-
spond to the needs, capacities or circumstances of those suffering from 
chronic pain. The ameliorative purpose factor is held inapplicable. Jus-
tice Gonthier argues that a legislative decision to redress the most severe 
cases “cannot serve to shield an outright failure to recognize the actual 
needs of an entire category of injured workers”.39 And finally, in terms 
of the nature of the interest affected, Gonthier J. clarifies: 
In many circumstances, economic deprivation itself may lead to a loss of 
dignity. In other cases, it may be symptomatic of widely-held negative 
                                                                                                                                
37
  Id., at para. 88. Noting that chronic pain sufferers are not required to show that they 
are more disadvantaged than the comparator group (those with other workplace disabilities). 
38
  Id., at para. 95. 
39
  Id., at para. 102. 
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attitudes towards the claimants and thus reinforce the assault on their 
dignity.40 
Furthermore, Gonthier J. emphasizes that the dignity of chronic pain 
sufferers is undermined because the provisions affect access to work and 
employment, which has been recognized as “a fundamental aspect of a 
person’s life”.41 The exclusion of chronic pain from the full range of 
workers’ compensation benefits reinforces negative assumptions about 
chronic pain “by sending the message that this condition is not ‘real’, in 
the sense that it does not warrant individual assessment or adequate 
compensation”.42  
In assessing whether the violation is justified pursuant to section 1 
of the Charter, Gonthier J. reviews the four identified purposes for the 
legislative exclusion of chronic pain from the workers’ compensation 
scheme. First, he rejects the purpose of ensuring the viability of the 
Accident Fund, writing that “[b]udgetary considerations in and of them-
selves cannot normally be invoked as a free-standing pressing and sub-
stantial objective.”43 Second, the objective of ensuring a consistent 
legislative response is rejected to the extent that “[m]ere administrative 
expediency or conceptual elegance cannot be sufficiently pressing and 
substantial to override a Charter right”.44 Justice Gonthier accepts the 
third purpose, the avoidance of fraudulent claims, but finds that the 
minimal impairment requirement is not satisfied because the “wholesale 
exclusion” of chronic pain sufferer results in provisions that “make no 
effort whatsoever to determine who is genuinely unable to work and 
who is abusing the system”.45 The fourth objective, to promote early 
medical intervention and return to work as the best available treatment 
for chronic pain conditions, also fails the minimal impairment test.46 
Precisely the opposite conclusion was reached at the Nova Scotia 
Court of Appeal.47 Justice Cromwell concludes that the special provi-
                                                                                                                                
40
  Id., at para. 103. 
41
  Id., at para. 104, citing Lavoie, supra, note 3, at para. 45. 
42
  Id., at para. 105. 
43
  Id., at para. 109. 
44
  Id., at para. 110. 
45
  Id., at para. 112. 
46
  Id., at para. 116. Justice Gonthier assumes without deciding that the fourth objective 
is pressing and substantial. 
47
  Martin C.A., supra, note 4. 
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sions for chronic pain injuries in the workers compensation scheme are 
not discriminatory. First, with respect to pre-existing disadvantage, he 
concludes that “the record in this case does not show widespread attri-
bution of traits that do not exist (i.e., stereotyping) or the historic disad-
vantage and prejudice in relation to chronic pain sufferers”.48 Second, in 
terms of the second and third factors, Cromwell J.A. writes:  
…chronic pain presents a difficult challenge to the workers’ compensation 
system….In his report prepared for the Board, Dr. Murray pointed out that 
chronic pain is a complex of physical, psychological, emotional, social 
and cultural factors that interplay to produce and continue this syndrome. 




Justice Cromwell further emphasizes that the “overall purpose of the 
workers’ compensation scheme is unquestionably ameliorative. There is 
considerable correspondence between the provisions and the circum-
stances, capacities and needs of injured workers with chronic pain …”.50 
In the end, Cromwell J.A. returns to what he calls the “key inquiry”:  
…would a reasonable person, in circumstances similar to those of the 
claimants and taking account of the various contextual factors, consider 
that the chronic pain provisions demean their human dignity? … do these 
provisions in purpose or effect, violate essential human dignity and 
freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping or political 
or social prejudice? Do the provisions perpetuate the view that injured 
workers with chronic pain are less capable or less worthy of recognition or 
value as human beings or as members of Canadian society?51  
His answer to these questions is no and the Court unanimously con-
cludes: 
I do not think…that the chronic pain provisions, viewed in the context of a 
targeted, ameliorative scheme like workers’ compensation and of the 
problematic place of chronic pain in that scheme would be seen as 
demeaning. Instead, these provisions would be seen as one of many 
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examples of the workers’ compensation scheme being unable to fully meet 
the legitimate needs of all.52 
How can we make sense of these contradictory outcomes? It appears 
that the contextual factors do not ensure consistent outcomes, as the 
above examples indicate. The historic disadvantage factor is sometimes 
simply disregarded, or framed in divergent and multiple ways. The 
correspondence and ameliorative purpose factors appear to bring vary-
ing degrees of justification into the section 15(1) analysis. Disagreement 
regarding the second and third factors also raises the extent to which 
justificatory considerations should be assessed in section 15, or left to a 
section 1 analysis. The fourth factor, the nature and scope of the interest 
affected, though seemingly concrete, is also subject to divergent inter-
pretations about what is at stake in various cases. In addition, the very 
nebulous overarching criterion of human dignity, speculatively assessed 
from the perspective of some abstract reasonable claimant, does not 
appear to provide significant certainty in predicting outcomes. Beyond 
these doctrinal debates, and arguably legitimate differences of opinion, 
are there larger, more institutional, historical or sociological factors that 
explain the widely divergent outcomes in equality law?  
III. SHIFTING CONCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE:  
FROM FORMAL TO SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Constitutional law develops against a backdrop of changing concep-
tions of the role of the state and shifting approaches to public policy, 
governance, and regulation. The evolution of legal approaches to equal-
ity reflects these different understandings of government. Formal equal-
ity, which is consistent with a classical liberal understanding of the role 
of government, has been replaced by the more social welfare concept of 
substantive equality, which in turn is now challenged by the emergence 
of neo-liberal theories. Some of the key differences between these ap-
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Classical Liberalism/ Formal Equality 
 
• Equality as an individual right  
• Equality of opportunity 
• Equality as equal treatment or sameness of treatment 
• Discrimination as an exceptional, irrational aberration 
• Equality grafted onto unquestioned institutional status quo 
• State to provide equal political and civil rights, but not responsible 
for social and economic inequalities in private sphere 
• Assimilative — right to be treated the same as individuals from 
dominant groups.  
 
Social Welfare State/ Substantive Equality 
 
• Equality as a group right  
• Equality of outcomes 
• Recognition of adverse effect discrimination — unequal effects of 
equal treatment based on dominant norms 
• Discrimination recognized as systemic  
• Equality requires systemic change and revising of dominant norms 
• State responsibility for social well-being (emergence of idea of 
social as well as political citizenship)  
• Instrumental conception of law — law can effect social change 
• Preventive and systemic remedial approaches regulated by the state 
• Accommodation of differences and diversity 
 
Neo-liberal Policy Developments  
 
• Decline in support for a social welfare state  
• Privatization of responsibility for economic well-being 
• Dismantling or downsizing of state agencies and institutions (e.g., 
human rights commissions) 
• Globalization, economic competition and accentuating inequalities 
(especially socio-economic) 
• Increased focus on individual responsibility 
• Resurgence of conservative moral values — traditional private fam-
ily (neo-conservatism) 
• Revival of formal equality discourse 
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In examining equality rights jurisprudence, it is nevertheless appar-
ent that judicial discourse does not consistently align itself with the 
dominant ideologies about the role of the state at any particular histori-
cal moment. For example, when welfare state ideology was at its high-
point politically in the 1960s and early 70s, the Supreme Court of 
Canada was articulating a classical liberal definition of equality rights 
(particularly in its interpretations of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights).53 
When neo-liberalism began to have an impact on Canadian public pol-
icy in the mid-1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court of Canada formally 
endorsed welfare state ideals regarding substantive equality and the 
systemic dimensions of legal inequality in interpreting human rights 
legislation and the Charter. At the same time, however, it has been sug-
gested that neo-liberal ideals have begun to influence Charter discourse, 
“not only in the rejuvenation of the classical liberal ideas of negative 
liberty and formal equality, but also in the introduction of the neo-liberal 
discourse of privatization”.54 
Despite the late 20th century passage of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, many of its basic legal presumptions are informed 
by 19th century classical liberalism.55 Structurally, it is predominantly a 
negative rights document, protecting citizens from state-based human 
rights violations. Furthermore, the “autonomous adult individual” of 
classical rights discourse is the main beneficiary of Charter protections. 
However, the Charter does contain important provisions that reflect both 
a more social democratic vision of the state and its more recent drafting. 
Section 15(1) secures equal protection and equal benefit of the law. 
Similarly, section 15(2) provides that ameliorative government laws or 
programs, designed to remedy group-based inequalities will not violate 
section 15(1). The balancing of fundamental rights and freedoms with 
countervailing societal interests is expressly mandated by section 1.56 As 
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well, the equality and positive rights dimensions of collective rights are 
integral to minority language rights provisions and to Aboriginal 
rights.57 Thus, the seeds of substantive equality are not entirely absent 
from the Charter itself. 
While judges have embraced the concept of substantive equality in 
interpreting the equality rights provisions of the Charter, the full impli-
cations of its redistributive underpinnings remain somewhat ambiguous. 
Substantive equality finds its theoretical sustenance in the egalitarian 
ideas of social democracy. Equality is measured by actual outcomes — 
by examining the effects of laws, policies, and programs on economic, 
social, political, and psychological well-being. The state (via govern-
ment policy, law, and formal rights) is accorded a primary and instru-
mental role in securing and enforcing equality. The shift to substantive 
equality also marks recognition that equal treatment can have unequal 
effects in a world of systemic inequality, that group-based histories of 
disadvantage matter, and that the accommodation of diversity and dif-
ference is sometimes necessary to advance equality of outcomes.  
Yet, substantive equality is out of sync with traditional legal theory, 
still influenced by the pull of legal formalism and steeped in the as-
sumptions of classical liberal thought.58 To carry substantive equality to 
its logical conclusion would be to challenge some of the fundamental 
economic and political pillars of modern society — something judges 
are not planning to do. While recognizing the importance of ameliora-
tive state action, there continues to be considerable judicial discomfort 
with the idea of positive economic and social rights.59 There is concern 
as well about the economic implications of recognizing poverty as a 
ground of discrimination. Such doctrinal developments would arguably 
force judges to make resource allocation decisions of a political nature 
— decisions deeply inconsistent with traditional understandings of judi-
cial review.  
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The pressures of neo-liberal social policy and the competitive global 
economic environment also pose challenges to the pursuit and realiza-
tion of substantive equality. Courts have increasingly been required to 
adjudicate government regulatory initiatives informed not by redistribu-
tive social welfare values, but by neo-liberal interests in privatizing 
social welfare responsibilities, increasing individual responsibility, and 
responding to global economic competition. Though initiated by the 
state, these regulatory measures have had detrimental effects on some of 
the most vulnerable groups in society. The extent to which constitution-
alized human rights, including substantive equality, can be relied upon 
to contest these policy developments remains uncertain. To the extent 
that provisions such as section 15(2) and section 1 of the Charter tend to 
presume a social welfare state ideology, such assumptions may be prob-
lematic with the apparent emergence of a neo-liberal public policy con-
text. It is important to ensure adequate government accountability, 
transparency, and scrutinize the extent to which the regulatory objec-
tives ameliorate or aggravate the conditions of socially disadvantaged 
individuals and groups. The current formulation of substantive equality 
simply does not provide sufficient guidance to judges, and the tendency 
to decide cases based on a section 15 analysis, rather than section 1, 
reduces the likelihood of significant government accountability. 
Adjudicating constitutional rights and freedoms becomes even more 
complex as new trends in government regulatory approaches emerge. 
Some suggest that new forms of social governance represent a synthesis 
of the egalitarian ideals of the social welfare state and the neo-liberal 
critique of big government with its “command and control” strategies 
for social change.60 Others maintain that the apparently new forms of 
social governance are predominantly inspired by neo-liberal ideology.61 
Nevertheless, these new approaches to government regulation are hav-
ing an impact on government policy-making and law reform. Con-
fronted with these new state initiatives, it is important for judges to 
appreciate their contours, distinctiveness and underlying assumptions, to 
allow for effective adjudication regarding their constitutionality. It is my 
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contention that these new forms of social governance may open up new 
pathways to equality, while potentially also creating new problems of 
inequality.  
IV. NEW FORMS OF SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 
One influential source of new thinking about the role of government 
in the global era is Anthony Giddens’ book, The Third Way — The Re-
newal of Social Democracy.62 Giddens articulates a new approach to 
governing that moves beyond both old style social democracy and the 
harshness of neo-liberalism. While he recognizes the inadequacy of 
traditional social democracy, he seeks to reconstruct it rather than re-
place it with a neo-liberal approach. His “third way” endorses the values 
of “equality, protection of the vulnerable, freedom as autonomy, no 
rights without responsibilities, no authority without democracy, cosmo-
politan pluralism, and philosophical conservatism”.63 Third way govern-
ance accords an important role to the state, but emphasizes the need to 
act in partnership with communities to reinvigorate democracy, and 
well-being on the individual and community levels. In effect, Giddens 
advocates a shift from a “welfare state” to a “welfare society”,64 charac-
terized by a robust and healthy civic life.  
In the domain of equality, Giddens defines “equality as inclusion 
and inequality as exclusion”.65 He rejects the neo-liberal focus on equal-
ity of opportunity because it risks resulting in too much disparity and 
inequality. Practically, it does not actually operate given the uneven and 
unfair privileges that skew the operation of meritocracy and equal op-
portunities. Equality as inclusion “…refers in its broadest sense to citi-
zenship, to the civil and political rights and obligations that all members 
of a society should have, not just formally, but as a reality of their 
lives”.66 Access to work and to education are two key components of 
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equality to be enjoyed in a renewed and healthy public space.67 Giddens 
insists that it is critical to redress the exclusion of marginalized groups 
at the bottom by ensuring their inclusion in education and employment. 
He also condemns what he calls “voluntary exclusion” marked by “a 
withdrawal from public institutions on the part of more affluent 
groups”.68 More privileged social groups opt out of public spaces (e.g., 
private schools, private healthcare, walled communities etc.). Giddens 
emphasizes how involuntary and voluntary exclusion are connected, 
with greater marginality reinforcing a greater retreat from the public 
domain. Both forms of exclusion, Giddens argues, are self-reproducing. 
Government policy must endeavour to break the self-perpetuating cycles 
of exclusion in order to foster and promote equality.  
1. The Social Investment State 
One important new public policy trend is the shift from a social wel-
fare to a social investment state. Giddens emphasizes that the “guideline 
is investment in human capital wherever possible rather than the direct 
provision of economic maintenance”.69 Jane Jenson and Denis Saint-
Martin characterize such a policy reorientation as a shift from Fordism 
to LEGOTMism.70 In other words, governments are shifting from “pas-
sive spending on social protection to investments that will generate an 
‘active society’ and an ‘active citizenry’”.71 Such measures focus on 
education and retraining for employment and increased civic participa-
tion. The LEGOTM imagery underscores a particular concern with the 
education and training of children — the future citizen-workers. It is 
designed to ensure “supply side egalitarianism” and “implies a concep-
tion of equality different from the one embedded in the post-war welfare 
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state”.72 Jenson and Saint-Martin explain that whereas “…social policy 
traditionally focused on redistribution, on fostering greater equality in 
the here-and-now... the LEGO model emphasises equality of life 
chances.”73 
The challenge of this shift in policy orientation to the adjudication 
of equality rights was apparent in the Gosselin case, which engaged the 
courts in assessing the fairness of an age-based remedial workfare and 
training program.74 Social assistance recipients under the age of 30 in 
Quebec were required to participate in educational or employment train-
ing programs to be entitled to receive full welfare benefits. Failure to 
participate resulted in a significant reduction in monthly benefits. Louise 
Gosselin, certified to represent the class of social assistance recipients 
under the age of 30, found her social assistance payments reduced on a 
number of occasions when she was not engaged in the remedial pro-
grams. She maintained that the reduced benefits were so low as to make 
it impossible to meet her basic needs for food and shelter, thereby deny-
ing her fundamental human dignity and constitutional rights.  
Though McLachlin C.J. affirms at the outset that section 15’s “pur-
pose of protecting equal membership and full participation in Canadian 
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society runs like a leitmotif through our section 15 jurisprudence”,75 she 
concludes that the conditional benefit entitlement does not violate equal-
ity.  
 The government’s longer-term purpose was to provide young welfare 
recipients with precisely the kind of remedial education and skills training 
they lacked and needed in order eventually to integrate into the workforce 
and become self-sufficient. This policy reflects the practical wisdom of 
the old Chinese proverb: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. 
Teach him how to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.” This was not a 
denial of young people’s dignity; it was an affirmation of their potential.76 
In a similar vein, she explains that: 
[T]he social assistance regime … sought to promote the self-sufficiency 
and autonomy of young welfare recipients through their integration into 
the productive workforce, and to combat the pernicious side effects of 
unemployment and welfare dependency. The participation incentive 
worked towards the realization of goals that go to the heart of the equality 
guarantee: self-determination, personal autonomy, self-respect, feelings of 
self-worth, and empowerment. These are the stuff and substance of 
essential human dignity….77 
Chief Justice McLachlin emphasizes that “[a]s a matter of common 
sense, if a law is designed to promote the claimant’s long-term auton-
omy and self-sufficiency, a reasonable person in the claimant’s position 
would be less likely to view it as an assault on her inherent human dig-
nity.”78 Here we see a shift away from the post-liberal focus on effects 
to assessment of rights violations in terms of the subjective perspective 
of a reasonable claimant. 
In her dissenting opinion, L’Heureux-Dubé J. emphasizes that “a 
discrimination claim should be evaluated primarily in terms of an im-
pugned distinction’s effects…The point of departure should not lie in 
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abstract generalizations about the nature of grounds”.79 Thus, it is not 
simply a matter of assessing the category of those less than 30 years of 
age; one must consider the harsh effects of inadequate social assistance 
in terms of lack of food, shelter and the inability to fulfil basic human 
needs. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concludes that the scheme resulted in a 
violation of both psychological and physical integrity: 
There is little question that living with the constant threat of poverty is 
psychologically harmful. There is no dispute that Ms. Gosselin lived at 
times below the government’s own standard of bare subsistence. In 1987, 
the monthly cost of proper nourishment was $152. The guaranteed 
monthly payment to young adults was $170. I cannot imagine how it can 
be maintained that Ms. Gosselin’s physical integrity was not breached.80 
Was the age-based initiative consistent with this new social invest-
ment approach to equality or did it reinforce inequality? Did it promote 
equality or harm individual social assistance recipients by failing to take 
into account to a sufficient degree the structural conditions of poverty 
and systemic constraints on individual capacities to participate in such 
retraining and employment initiatives?  
2. The Facilitative State and Responsibilization Strategies  
A second important change in regulatory approaches involves a shift 
from an instrumentalist state to a facilitative state. David Garland charac-
terizes this shift in the domain of criminal justice policy as the “responsi-
bilization strategy”, or “governmentality”.81 In contrast to the traditional 
command and control approach to law and policy, responsibilization 
strategies “extend the reach of state agencies by linking them up with 
practices of actors in the ‘private sector’ and ‘the community’”.82 Garland 
                                                                                                                                
79
  Id., at para. 111 [emphasis in original]. 
80
  Id., at para. 130.  
81
  D. Garland, The Culture of Control — Crime and Social Order in Contemporary So-
ciety (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), at 124-27. Garland relies on Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. See M. Foucault, “Governmentality” in Burchell et al. 
(eds.) The Foucault Effect (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Sheatsheaf, 1992). 
82
  Id., at 124. Interesting parallels characterize human rights policies, which in the 
1960s and 70s, relied predominantly in state-enforced command and control policies, focused 
on the individual complaints process, investigated and controlled by state-financed human 
rights commissions. It is only in the 1980s and beyond that we see the emergence of employ-
 
(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) Inclusive Equality 67 
 
maintains that this shift reflects government acknowledgment of what he 
calls a “basic sociological truth: that the most important processes produc-
ing order and conformity are mainstream social processes within the 
institutions of civil society, not the uncertain threat of legal sanctions”.83 
Garland’s insights in this regard parallel a growing scholarship on legal 
pluralism.84 Responsibilization strategies also resonate with a recent fed-
eral public policy interest in “social capital”, defined as “the networks of 
social relations that provide access to needed resources and supports”.85 It 
is hoped that an examination of social capital as a public policy measure 
will provide “a useful lens for understanding the health of a community or 
civil society, and potentially … important clues to variations in social and 
economic outcomes”.86 
Pursuant to a responsibilization approach, government policy in-
creasingly employs indirect forms of social governance that effectively 
delegate government functions to non-state actors. Speaking in terms of 
criminal justice policy, Garland explains: 
Government authorities are, in this field of policy as in several others, 
operating across and upon the boundaries that used to separate the private 
from the public realm, seeking to renegotiate the question of what is 
properly a state function and what is not. In doing so, they are also 
beginning to challenge the central assumption of penal modernism, which 
took it for granted that crime control was a specialist task, best 
concentrated within a differentiated state institution.87 
From a constitutional law perspective, these developments render com-
plex the classical liberal dichotomy between the public and the private. 
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Judicial attempts to respond to these shifts in delineating the contours of 
the state action doctrine have been understandably complicated, though 
the Supreme Court has been endeavouring to recognize state action 
despite the indirect or delegated nature of government responsibility.88 
3. The Partnership State  
A third strategy of new social governance, which is a dimension of 
the responsibilization approach, engages the state in partnerships for 
social change.89 I highlight it separately because in the domain of equal-
ity rights, it is integral to the pursuit of equality by collectivities, par-
ticularly minority language and Aboriginal communities. Wendy Larner 
and David Craig, maintain that local partnerships “are usefully under-
stood as a post-welfarist, post-neoliberal form of social governance”.90 
They represent innovative strategies on the part of local communities and 
the cutting edge of decentralized, locally responsive government. As such, 
they present important challenges to more traditional, centralized, 
vertically integrated, sectoral approaches to policy development, service 
provision and community support. 91 
In distinguishing local partnerships as a model of governance, Larner 
and Craig maintain that “[w]hereas Keynesian welfarist strategies were 
premised on universalist nation-state conceptions of the social, and 
earlier neo-liberal strategies focused primarily on the individual, the 
new form of social governance recognizes multiple and fragmented 
social groups”.92 Of significance in terms of equality rights is the con-
nection they make between the emergence of identity politics, rejecting 
the “assimilationist and integrationist assumptions of earlier policy 
formulations” and the rise of the partnership model. In turn, local com-
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munities are themselves understood as internally diverse, meaning that 
they do not always speak in one voice. 
In the Canadian constitutional context, the local partnership model 
of governance has been important in Aboriginal law and policy. To what 
extent does constitutional equality or constitutional Aboriginal rights 
require forms of governance that empower local communities?93 How 
do judges adjudicate divisions between Aboriginal communities or 
within particular communities? In the domain of minority language 
education, democratic participation in education policy, empowerment 
of parents, and government accountability for inaction in setting up 
effective minority language education, have been informed by underly-
ing collective conceptions of equality.94 
V. INCLUSIVE EQUALITY: THE PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY  
It would appear, therefore, that these new forms of social govern-
ance hold both promise and risks for the attainment of equality. While it 
is possible to continue to advocate an approach to constitutional equality 
that focuses on the substantive effects of new governance initiatives, it 
is also essential to scrutinize their institutional, systemic and procedural 
dimensions. To engage in the most difficult debates regarding the mean-
ing and application of equality means developing principles and doc-
trines that speak to institutional dynamics of discrimination, the 
intersection of public and private normativity, the intergenerational 
reproduction of inequality, process values such as democracy, citizen-
ship, participation, transparency, accountability in decision-making, and 
mechanisms for reinforcing both individual and collective agency and 
empowerment. There are glimpses of recognition of these complex and 
dynamic public policy issues within judicial decisions, but they are 
fleeting and not connected to a larger theory of equality rights that re-
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sponds to the challenges of inequality in a neo-liberal and post neo-
liberal world. Indeed, the shift to human dignity reflects a renewed fo-
cus on process issues, such as the ameliorative objective of the state and 
the correspondence between the needs and circumstances of the claim-
ant and the purpose of the government initiative. The process implica-
tions of this shift, however, are not openly acknowledged, funneled as 
they are through the vague substantive ideal of human dignity.  
What theoretical conception of equality would provide sufficient 
guidance to adjudicators in the context of these new social policy initia-
tives? While these new forms of social governance raise questions about 
how we conceptualize the first two steps in the Law equality framework, 
I want to focus on the human dignity criterion for assessing substantive 
discrimination and the contextual factors analysis. Simply put, it is my 
contention that the human dignity inquiry and the contextual factors set 
out in Law, though useful in some ways, do not provide us with suffi-
cient guidance in adjudicating the procedural and substantive fairness 
issues at the heart of constitutional equality rights. 
While the concept of substantive equality was essential in taking us 
beyond a formal equality that looked only to procedural equal treatment 
and not to equality of substantive outcomes, focusing on effects alone 
may not provide us with sufficient insight into the institutional and 
systemic reproduction of inequality. We still require a comprehensive 
and coherent analysis of the effects of inequality, but we also need an 
explicit assessment of process issues to understand how inequalities are 
reproduced in the procedural and institutional contexts of public and 
private life. Such an inquiry will then set the groundwork for the devel-
opment of remedial approaches that redress not only the conditions of 
inequality, but the systemic dimensions of its reproduction as well. 
What I am suggesting is a rethinking of the parameters of substantive 
equality or the replacement of substantive equality with a new synthe-
sizing concept — inclusive equality — a vision of equality that would 
emphasize the intimate connection between process and substance in 
terms of our understanding of both sections 15 and 1 of the Charter.95 
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 A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), note at 26: “Procedural and constitutional democrats agree that their 
disagreement turns on the question of whether democratic procedures have priority over just 
outcomes or just outcomes have priority over democratic procedures. Deliberative democracy 
rejects this dichotomy. It sees deliberation as an outcome-oriented process…”. 
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In this concluding section, I provide some preliminary ideas about 
how we might reframe the contextual factors to articulate more clearly 
the harmful effects of discrimination, inequitable process concerns, and 
greater clarity on the extent to which efforts to ameliorate social disad-
vantage should be assessed as part of the section 15 inquiry. This re-
thinking also requires a reappraisal of the interaction between sections 
15(1) and (2), the latter effectively subsumed under the contextual fac-
tors analysis in the wake of the Law and Lovelace decisions.96 Finally, 
the role of section 1 in equality jurisprudence needs to be clarified, par-
ticularly in an era of shifting public policy paradigms. 
As is so often done, it is important to revisit McIntyre J.’s judgment 
in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.97 Drawing on his recent 
innovations recognizing adverse effects discrimination in the domain of 
statutory human rights law, McIntyre J. approached the constitutional 
equality guarantees through a human rights code lens.98 He therefore 
recognized that discrimination was often caused by harmful differential 
treatment, but that it might also result from facially neutral legislative 
policies that had harmful differential effects on diverse groups in soci-
ety. A process-based definition of equality that considered only whether 
there had been differential treatment was accordingly inadequate and 
McIntyre J. endorsed an effects-based test. It was by examining the 
effects of a law or policy (rather than its form) that judges could identify 
whether or not discrimination existed. And the effects, obviously, had to 
be harmful. In statutory equality rights cases, arising in the context of 
employment, the provision of services or housing, the harm of discrimi-
nation is often clear — exclusion or less advantageous employment 
remuneration, benefits or working conditions.  
In the constitutional context, courts must assess the fairness of legis-
lation, a particularly complex exercise when government benefit pro-
grams are the focus of the litigation or when the legislation is a response 
to complicated histories of social inequality. Thus, we see the Supreme 
Court providing additional guidance in its articulation of human dignity 
as an overriding purpose of section 15 and in its enumeration of four 
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  See Law, supra, note 6; Lovelace, supra, note 16. 
97
  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6. 
98
  This statutory frame of reference explains in part the current difficulties we are hav-
ing in understanding the specific challenges of constitutional equality and the extent to which 
equality rights demand state-based redistribution, fairness, accountability, transparency.  
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contextual factors for assessing whether human dignity has been under-
mined. How might we reframe the contextual factors analysis? A pre-
liminary elaboration of a revised contextual factors analysis is set out 
below:99 
1. Contextual Factors100 
Types of Harmful Effects: An assessment of whether the law, policy or 
program results in harmful effects, including:  
 
• economic exclusion or disadvantage 
• social exclusion, prejudice, denials of membership 
• psychological harms to dignity, respect, integrity, identity 
• physical harms to bodily integrity, security, health and well-being 
• political exclusion  
 
Degree of Harm: An assessment of the degree or extent of harm (from 
relatively minor infringements to significant or major encroachments on 
economic, social, psychological, physical, political well-being).  
 
Exclusionary Processes and Structural/Systemic Dimensions of Harm: 
• Pre-existing disadvantage101 
• Reinforcement of disadvantage, vulnerability, harmful dependen-
cies102 
                                                                                                                                
99
  For the purposes of this article, only the very general contours are enumerated. I am 
currently in the process of expanding this analysis in a research project entitled, Inclusive 
Equality: Rethinking Rights, Relationships and Remedies, supported by the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council.  
100
  One useful enumeration of categories of rights, sites of power and domains of em-
powerment is provided by D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order — From the Modern 
State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), Table 
9.1, at 192-94. 
101
  Situating the individual in her or his social/collective/group context is critical to dis-
crimination law, which prohibits group-based harms and exclusion. 
102
  See Falkiner v. Ontario (Minister of Community and Social Services) (2002-05-13 
(ONCA)). Justice Laskin of the Ontario Court of Appeal formulated the first contextual factor 
in this way at para. 99 and discusses the nature of the interest at stake at para. 105. See also, 
“Abrams, ‘Sex Wars’”, supra, note 73. For a discussion of a distinction between relationships 
of temporary versus permanent inequality, see C. Sheppard, “Caring in Human Relations and 
Legal Approaches to Equality” (1993) 2 N.J.C.L. 305-45.  
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• Exclusion from decision-making processes 
• Absence of democratic participation103 
• Absence of consultation104 
• Access to justice, institutions, processes 
• Failure to investigate possibilities of accommodation105 
 
This restatement of the contextual factors to a certain degree sub-
sumes the second and third factor into the first inquiry into whether 
there are harmful effects. It also extends the scope of the inquiry into the 
processes of exclusion, disadvantage and harm. 
2.  Section 15(2) and Ameliorative Government Laws, Programs 
and Activities 
The Supreme Court has endorsed section 15(2) as an interpretive 
aid, designed to underscore the substantive meaning of equality in sec-
tion 15(1). Section 15(2), however, may be understood in two ways. 
First, it may be understood simply to indicate that differential treatment 
alone is insufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination. There must be 
harmful effects as well. For individuals and groups who do not share the 
needs or disadvantages that ameliorative programs are designed to re-
dress, there is simply no harm. For example, if the government subsi-
dizes hearing aids, an individual without a hearing impairment is not 
harmed by the government subsidy. Second, section 15(2) may be relied 
upon to resolve conflicting equality claims in favour of historically 
disadvantaged groups, without recourse to section 1.106 Thus, it would 
be relevant where governments are faced with violating equality rights 
through either action or inaction. Failure to develop an ameliorative 
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  C. Sheppard, “Equality Rights and Democratic Theory” (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author, 2003); See also Young, supra, note 8. 
104
  Some of the ideas emerging on the duty to consult and Aboriginal rights could be ap-
plied to equality. See T. Isaac, “The Crown’s Duty to Consult and Accommodate Aboriginal 
People” (2003) 61 The Advocate 865.  
105
  See British Columbia (Public Service Employees Relations Commission) v. 
B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1999] S.C.J. No. 46. See D. Lepofsky, “The Duty to Ac-
commodate: A Purposive Approach” (1992) 1 Can. Labour L.J. 1 (outlining the procedural 
and substantive dimensions of the duty to accommodate). 
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  See C. Sheppard, Litigating the Relationship between Equity and Equality (Ontario 
Law Reform Commission Study Paper, 1992), at 46. 
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program or law would effectively perpetuate a status quo that repro-
duces systemic inequalities. While section 1 could also be relied upon to 
justify ameliorative programs, section 15(2) effectively signals a consti-
tutional preference in favour of historically disadvantaged groups.107  
3.  Government Accountability and Section 1  
While courts appear increasingly reluctant to deal with equality 
rights cases through the section 1 analysis, preferring instead to deny 
claims under the nebulous human dignity test, section 1 is of critical 
importance in an era of shifting approaches to governance and regula-
tion. It provides a coherent substantive and procedural inquiry that de-
mands government accountability, transparency, respect for democracy, 
and evidence-based public policy decision-making. 108 The basic Oakes 
framework requires the state to justify, in both substantive and proce-
dural terms, the fairness of its regulatory initiatives.109 If section 1 is not 
invoked, the government does not have the burden of justifying its ex-
clusionary choices.  
It is in this context that an understanding of changing approaches to 
government regulation is particularly important. Whether one views the 
state as the predominant source of rights infringements (the classical 
liberal and neo-liberal visions), as a source of enhancement and protec-
tion of rights (the social welfare state) or as some combination of the 
two (new forms of social governance), will have a major influence on 
the nature and degree of scrutiny accorded under section 1. Accordingly, 
it is essential to have a nuanced understanding of shifting regulatory 
paradigms when applying the substantive and procedural components of 
the section 1 analysis. In some equality cases, it appears that judges 
adopt a somewhat deferential stance when faced with apparently amelio-
rative government initiatives. While such deference may have been 
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  The Trociuk case provides an illustration of a case where there are conflicting prob-
lems of inequality. 
108
  On the importance of evidence-based legal reasoning, see D. Greschner and S. 
Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-based Decision-Making: Medicare in the Courts” (2003) 82 
Can. Bar Rev. 501. 
109
  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7. On the connection between 
democracy and section 1, see M. Jackman, “Protecting Rights and Promoting Democracy: 
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appropriate during the heyday of the Keynesian social welfare state era, 
it does not provide sufficient protection to human rights in an age of 
neo-liberal and new regulatory approaches to governance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite widespread consensus about the importance of equality in 
modern society, as a constitutional right, it eludes easy definition. The 
rhetorical power of the ideal of human dignity does not provide suffi-
cient specificity to adjudicate the complex and dynamic problems of 
discrimination, yet it is often the decisive inquiry under the Law analy-
sis. As a result, we are left with a patchwork of contradictory outcomes 
that are difficult to reconcile. Returning to the 2003 equality rights 
cases, what is encouraging in the Supreme Court decision in Martin is 
the demonstrated willingness to find a violation of section 15, based on 
an holistic assessment of the legislation — an evaluation that considered 
both exclusionary processes and harmful effects. Justice Gonthier also 
engages in a stringent section 1 analysis, scrutinizing the legitimacy of 
the legislative objectives and the means devised to attain them. In con-
trast, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal deferred to the legislature in the 
context of the ameliorative workers’ compensation program, denying 
the equality claim under section 15 and thereby excusing the govern-
ment from justifying the exclusion of chronic pain injuries under section 
1. Such an approach, though consistent with the tenor of the majority 
opinions of the Supreme Court in earlier cases,110 may not ensure suffi-
cient accountability and transparency when governments exclude indi-
viduals and groups from the reach of social programs. 
The Trociuk case is more complex. The reasoning in Trociuk has 
been critiqued for the ways in which it reinforces a formal equality 
approach without adequate consideration of the substantive inequalities 
between mothers and fathers.111 Beyond the abstract concern with treat-
ing both parents as symbolically equal, one wonders to what extent the 
procedures for birth registration and naming may legitimately exclude 
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fathers to secure the equality of mothers?112 The effects of the exclusion 
are addressed, but the procedural dimensions of redressing the exclusion 
are unclear.113 Moreover, when and to what extent should family dis-
putes be subject to litigation? Indeed, it is interesting that despite appar-
ently winning at the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Trociuk did not 
actually get what he went to court to obtain — inclusion of his name as 
part of the surname of the children. The mother had already agreed to 
include his name on the birth registration documents. Before providing 
such a remedy, the Court wisely required that the matter be assessed in 
light of the best interests of the children. These 2003 cases, therefore, 
reflect how constitutional law engages us in inquiries into the role of the 
state in the lives of individuals and communities. In tracing the contours 
of a conception of constitutional equality that includes an inquiry into 
both the substantive and procedural dimensions of exclusion and dis-
crimination, I hope to encourage greater scrutiny of the institutional and 
systemic aspects of inequality. As jurists, it is also important to be aware 
of the larger macro-historical contexts within which state regulation 
occurs. In highlighting shifting public policy paradigms, I hope to ad-
vance the potential for constitutional lawyers to make arguments that 
take into account the complexities of new forms of social governance. In 
this way, we may secure effective protection of socially disadvantaged 
individuals and communities, and empower individuals and communi-
ties, within a regulatory context of democratic accountability, transpar-
ency, and fairness.  
 
                                                                                                                                
112
  If such were the case, s. 15(2) might have been relevant in resolving the conflicting 
equality concerns.  
113
  Additional questions are also left unanswered in Trociuk. See “Lessard, ‘Mothers’” 
supra, note 23. As Lessard clarifies, the ameliorative objectives of the state in this domain are 
questionable, as birth registration and the defining of family units are intimately connected to 
larger questions of public versus private responsibility for the economic well-being of family 
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